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INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the English expressed interest in assimilating into the European
Patent Convention (“EPC”).1 In order to facilitate entry into the EPC, England
sought to bring its patent system in-line with the other countries in the EPC.2
Unfortunately the English hurried in enacting a new law, and overlooked the fact
that many of the provisions of the EPC were based on the German patent system,
which was a central claim interpretation system.3 The English, with a peripheral
claim interpretation system, lacked any recourse to limit patent claims that
awarded patent rights broader than the accompanying disclosure.4 To this day,
the English still have difficulty with these so-called “free beer” claims.5
The recent reform enacted on September 16, 2011 fundamentally changed
how the U.S. patent system addresses the disclosure requirement.6 The United
States no longer has a means of policing patents that hide the best mode but
otherwise adequately enable one skilled in the art of how to make and use the
disclosed invention. Twenty years from now, America’s equivalent to England’s
“free beer” claim may involve hidden best mode fact patterns unless, as this
article suggests, the U.S. either strengthens its enforcement of best mode through
35 U.S.C. § 112 or inherits a central claim interpretation regime.7
First, before analyzing how the new law got us into this mess, it is necessary
to discuss the policy behind the patent system and have an adequate
understanding of each disclosure requirement and their interrelatedness under the
old law.8 This article follows with an examination of the effects of the LeahySmith America Invents Act (“AIA”)9 of 2011.10 Next, in search of solutions, the
U.K. patent system is analyzed for its response after it eliminated the best mode
requirement.11 Drawing on the knowledge from the United Kingdom, this article
1

Dale L. Carlson, et. al, Patent Linchpin for the 21st Century? – Best Mode Revisited, 45
IDEA 267, 285 (2005).
2
See Terje Gudmestad, Patent Law of the United States and the United Kingdom: A
Comparison, 5 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 176 (1982) (stating that “The purpose of
the Act is threefold: (a) it codifies much of the prior British patent law; (b) it modernizes several
areas of British patent law . . . ; and (c) it unifies patent law with that of other European
countries.”) (footnotes omitted).
3
See 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4.4 n.1 (4th ed. 2010).
4
See infra Part IV.
5
See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.4 n.1.
6
See infra Part III.
7
See infra Part V.
8
See infra Part II.
9
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
10
See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part IV.
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argues that a stronger enforcement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 or a switch to a central
claim interpretation are two legitimate ways of dealing with hidden best mode fact
patterns under the AIA.12 Finally, this article concludes that some other
mechanism must step in to take the place of best mode in order to avoid granting
patents that offend the underlying principles of patent law.13
II.

BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM AND DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS

A. Purpose of the Patent System
The rationale behind the intellectual property provision in the United States
Constitution is based on the idea of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”14 Ever since the first patent statute
was enacted in 1790, Congress and the public have wrestled with the cost-benefit
analysis associated with granting a patent.15 The social costs of issuing a patent
involve negative effects on competition through single-source price control16 and
decreased rate of future inventive activity.17 On the other hand, patent law seeks
to promote progress by ensuring that the patent right issued to protect the
inventor’s invention “is commensurate with what the inventor discloses to the
public,” a quid pro quo exchange of patent rights for disclosure.18 Such “adequate
disclosure” encourages invention because “the expectation that patent rights will
be available causes inventions to be sought after more vigorously.”19 The other
social benefit most often discussed is the increased incentive to innovate.20

12

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
14
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15
See MOY, supra note 3, § 1:26–42.
16
See id. § 1:31–33 (stating that a supplier with single-source price control will drive up price
by decreasing supply); see also Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent
Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 407 (2010) (explaining that “[d]eadweight loss, allocative
inefficiency, and wealth transfer from consumers to the [patentees]” are potential consequences of
the current system where only a single supplier exists).
17
See MOY, supra note 3, § 1:31. The efforts to discover new technology are hindered by the
newly patented technology, because after discovery the technology becomes “legally unusable”
and “actually decreases the incentive to invent within the controlled field.” Id. § 1:34.
18
Krista Stone, Written Description After Ariad v. Eli Lilly: 35 USC § 112’s Third Wheel, 11 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 191, 222 (2010); see MOY, supra note 3, § 1:37.
19
MOY, supra note 3, § 1:38. This is important because patenting leads to follow-on
innovation, which “accounts for the vast majority of technological breakthroughs.” Devlin, supra
note 16, at 408.
20
MOY, supra note 3, § 1:40 (stating that incentive to “invent” is different from incentive to
“innovate” where innovation involves commencement of commercialization).
13
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In general, society has determined that the benefits of awarding patents exceed
the costs and therefore encourage patenting of inventions. Although the quid pro
quo idea is easy to grasp, there is incentive—for example, the clear and
convincing proof standard for proving invalidity21—for patentees to do whatever
it takes to get a patent.22 This attitude undermines the policy justifications of the
patent system.
B. Elements and Mechanisms of Adequate Disclosure
The patent system uses 35 U.S.C. § 112 to lay out three disclosure
requirements that require inventors to disclose certain information about the
invention in order to be eligible for the quid pro quo exchange:23
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.24
The three disclosure requirements include an adequate written description, an
enablement, and a best mode requirement.25 These three requirements work in
unison to ensure that the inventor fulfills his obligations during patent
prosecution.26 The required disclosure in the specification works in concert with
the information contained in the claims to promote the ultimate disclosure: the
scope of the claimed invention.27 To identify the scope of the claimed invention,
it is necessary to study each disclosure requirement individually, how the three
requirements interrelate, and how these requirements interact with claim
interpretation.

21

E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Patents as Credence Goods, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 707,
714–15 (2007) (finding that revoking the patent and challenging validity gives incentive to
patentee to do whatever one needed to do to get a patent).
23
See 2 MOY, supra note 3, § 7:1.
24
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
25
See generally Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(affirming the presence of a written description requirement separate from the enablement
requirement); Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that
“[t]he best mode requirement is ‘separate and distinct’ from enablement . . . .”) (citing In re Gay,
309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
26
See 2 MOY, supra note 23, § 7:1.
27
See Devlin, supra note 16, at 409–10.
22
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1. Written Description Requirement
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states “[t]he specification shall contain a
written description of the invention . . . .”28 The purpose of the written
description requirement is to ensure that the inventor discloses enough details of
the invention so that subsequent inventors can improve and build upon the
patent’s teachings and to ensure that the inventor “was in full possession” of the
claimed invention on the day of filing.29
As the patent system evolved and new patent statutes were introduced, the
rationale for applying the written description evolved.30 The written description
requirement inherited a much larger role in invalidating patents after its
application in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.31 where it
invalidated a patent for failing to meet the written description requirement. One
commentator claimed that this created a “super-enablement” requirement and
feared that this would limit a patent “only to those embodiments disclosed” and
create rights that are narrow and easily invented around.32
Much debate has centered on whether or not this is a separate disclosure
requirement. In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”)
issued its latest ruling on the matter confirming the existence of a separate written
description requirement.33 The court has applied written description in two
contexts since its en banc ruling in Ariad.34

28

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011).
See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.04 (2011).
30
See In re Baker 559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The written description requirement can be
traced back to early Supreme Court cases where its primary purpose was public notice. See Evans
v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
31
119 F.3d 1559, 1562. Because Eli Lilly disclosed only the chemical’s function rather than
its structure, the court invalidated the patent for failing to meet the written description
requirement. Id. at 1568.
32
See Stone, supra note 18, at 201. Limiting patent rights “only to those embodiments
disclosed” rather than to what is stated in the claims necessitates a mention of the central claim
interpretation upon which this rationale is based.
33
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The
Ariad case pitted Judge Lourie—defender of written description—against Judge Rader, a fierce
opponent of the written description. Id. Ultimately, Judge Lourie’s camp won out, deciding in
favor of a separate written description requirement. See also Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written
Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 63, 84–88 (2010).
34
Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (deciding the
first case since the court’s decision in Ariad). Despite choosing not to strictly adhere to Judge
Newman’s reasoning in Ariad, the court still found invalidity on grounds of failure to meet the
written description. The court relied primarily on the disclosure-for-monopoly rationale.
29
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2. Enablement Requirement
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the written description of the
invention must be “in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any
person skill in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”35 An assessment of enablement
requires an examination into whether “everything within the scope of the claim is
enabled.”36 This examination is required because the “level of disclosure
necessary to satisfy section 112 of title 35 varies according to the scope of the
claimed invention.”37
The rationale behind the enablement requirement involves ensuring a
disclosure of the invention sufficient to give interested persons possession of the
invention.38 Courts enforce the requirement that a specification “must teach those
skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention
without ‘undue experimentation.’”39 In In re Wands, the CAFC established
factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is needed
to practice the invention.40

35

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, , U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, MPEP § 2164.08 (8th ed.,
rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The focus of the examination inquiry is whether
everything within the scope of the claim is enabled. Accordingly, the first analytical step requires
that the examiner determine exactly what subject matter is encompassed by the claims.”).
37
CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Title 35 requires
only that the inventor enable one of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention.” (citing Durel Corp v. Osram Sylvania Inc, 256 F.3d 1298, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir.
1988))).
38
2 MOY, supra note 23, § 7.2. See also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 219 (1832)
(explaining that a patent specification and description “is necessary in order to give the public,
after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed”).
39
In re Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561 (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
The court in In re Wright went on to say that “[n]othing more than objective enablement is
required, and therefore it is irrelevant whether this teaching is provided through broad terminology
or illustrative examples.” Id. (citing In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
40
See In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. The factors include:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.
Id. (citing In re Forman 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 (1986)).
36
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3. Best Mode Requirement
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the disclosure “shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”41 The
primary purpose of this requirement is to prevent inventors from withholding
trade secrets that give them a competitive advantage while simultaneously
securing patent rights on a different embodiment of the invention.42
In order to conduct a best mode inquiry, the definition of the invention must
be derived from the scope of the claims.43 Consequently, the CAFC applies a two
prong test to determine whether the inventor complied with the best mode
requirement.44 The first prong is a subjective inquiry into the inventor’s state of
mind at the time of filing to determine whether the inventor possessed a best
mode for practicing the invention.45 Second, an objective inquiry focused on the
scope of the claimed invention and the skill level in the art is used to determine
whether the written description discloses the best mode such that one reasonably
skilled in the art could practice the invention.46
In Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, the CAFC applied the modern best
mode requirement.47 The court identifies three scenarios where the scope of the
disclosure fails to meet the best mode requirement: the best mode disclosure
requirement only refers to the invention defined by the claims,48 the failure to
41

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (1962) (reversing the USPTO decision and siding with the
inventor because there was no reason for holding that appellant withheld best mode).
43
N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). This is an important
point because claim interpretation strategy will decide the definition of the invention upon which
the best mode inquiry will take place. See id at 1286–87. “Once the invention has been defined
by examining the claim, the finder of fact . . . can proceed to determine whether the inventor
subjectively possessed a best mode of practicing the claimed invention.” Accord Bayer AG v.
Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
44
See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286 (“The first inquiry is whether, at the time of filing the
patent application, the inventor considered a particular mode of practicing his invention superior to
all other modes. This inquiry is wholly subjective; that is, it focuses on the inventor's state of mind
at the time he filed his patent application. The second inquiry is whether the inventor's disclosure
is adequate to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best mode of the invention.
This inquiry is objective and depends upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of
skill in the relevant art.”) (citation omitted); see also MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03.
45
N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286; see also MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03.
46
N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286.
47
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Section 112 only
demands disclosure of ‘the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112)).
48
See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1315; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(stating that best mode is limited to the invention as defined in the claims).
42
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disclose a preferred embodiment,49 and the failure to disclose a preference that
materially affects making50 or using51 the invention. Commentary highlights two
important problems with the current enforcement of best mode.52 First, as stated
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference, there is no requirement that the
applicant point out which mode is the “best.”53 Further, the applicant is not
required to update the best mode during prosecution54 even though the applicant is
required to amend claims. Because the best mode inquiry is of the inventor’s
mind at the time of filing, any best mode at the time of filing may no longer be the
best mode at the time the patent issues. With no requirement to update during
prosecution, enforcement of best mode is limited. This is a point often restated by
opponents of the best mode requirement. Despite its limitations, the best mode
requirement is an integral part of the overall disclosure requirement.
4. Application and Interrelatedness of Disclosure Requirements and
Importance of Claim Interpretation
a. Disclosure Requirements
With the enactment of the AIA the best mode requirement was eliminated as a
means of defense in patent infringement cases.55 It is critical to understand the
context in which a patent is invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 282(3),56 because
invalidity is possible when only one of the § 112 requirements is missing.57

49

See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1316–17; U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); N.
Telecom, Inc., v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
50
See Spectra-Physics, Inc., v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating
that the failure to disclose the actual method of brazing preferred by the inventor rendered the
patent claims invalid for failure to meet the best mode).
51
See Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P’ship, 860 F.2d 415, 419–420 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the
failure to disclose the fluoride treatment of valve seals had a material effect on the properties of
the claimed invention and was grounds for invalidity of the patent claim for failure to disclose the
best mode of carrying out the invention).
52
See generally Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129 (2011).
53
E.g. Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that “there
is no requirement in 35 U.S.C. 112 that an applicant point out which of his embodiments he
considers his best mode; that the disclosure includes the best mode contemplated by the applicant
is enough to satisfy the statute.”). The court used the reasoning of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences to decide that the statutory requirement for best mode was satisfied. Id.
54
See Markham, supra note 52, at 138–39 (citing KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET. AL, PATENT
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 570 (West 3rd ed. 2008)).
55
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
56
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2011). The language of the statute, pre-AIA, states that: “The following
shall be defenses in any action involving the validity of infringement of a patent and shall be
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As identified in Bayer, there are only three scenarios susceptible to best mode
invalidity.58 In each situation, each disclosure requirement plays a unique role.
After studying these roles, it is apparent that although the disclosure requirements
are interchangeable, in some instances best mode acts as the only means for
invalidation in certain situations. Therefore, in order to develop a plan on how to
adjudicate hidden best mode fact patterns in the future, it is important to
understand how the requirements relate to each other and under what
circumstances the requirements are interchangeable when used as affirmative
defenses.
The establishment of a separate written description requirement allows courts
to tackle a specific type of specification where there is enablement but not a
written description.59 A separate best mode requirement allows courts to address
situations where a patent is valid under both written description and enablement
but invalid under best mode.60 The importance of a separate best mode
requirement is explained as follows:
Although some have suggested that disclosure solely sufficient to
provide “enablement” of the invention should be adequate to
protect society's interests, from a practical standpoint this is not,
and cannot be, the case. Best mode and enablement requirements
are predicated on different policies and are designed to achieve
different, albeit complementary, goals. While the enablement
pleaded: . . . (3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of section 112 . . . .” Id.
57
“[F]or failure to comply with any requirement of section 112” signifies that absence of any
one of the disclosure requirements may result in invalidation. See id. (emphasis added).
58
See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
59
Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (And Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 55, 66–67
(2000). Janis uses Judge’s Rich analysis from a non-precedential opinion to outline why it is
important to have a separate written description requirement:
Although a specification that meets the written description requirement
always satisfies the enablement requirement, the converse is not always true.
The written description must “enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use” the
claimed invention. A patent specification, however, may fortuitously enable
those of skill in the art to make and use an invention that an applicant did not
make before filing the patent application. This latter application would satisfy
the enablement requirement, but would not provide a section 112, first
paragraph, “written description” adequate to support claims directed toward the
later-made invention.
Id. (citing In re Hunter, 1995 WL 36475 at *5 (citations omitted)).
60
See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Janis, supra
note 59, at 66–67.
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requirement circumscribes a modicum of disclosure, that
disclosure need only be sufficiently detailed to allow those skilled
in the relevant art, without undue experimentation, to make and use
the invention. Indeed, no working example is required, and an
example based merely on hypothesized results may suffice.61
Best mode is additionally important in its capacity as a means of showing
invalidity, because, as the USPTO has admitted in the MPEP, the patent
examiners cannot know the best mode unless the inventors disclose it.62 Thus,
most often the only way to discover a hidden best mode is during discovery in a
litigation setting.63 As such, patent applications that would be invalid based only
on a failure to disclose best mode raise the possibility that invalid patents will
issue and remain free from a finding of invalidity:
[E]nablement is a less-than-stringent requirement. Disclosing any
mode of carrying out the invention evidences compliance with
enablement, even a mode that the inventor knows to be inadequate
in the marketplace. This puts any competitor seeking to enter the
market upon expiration of the patent at a huge competitive
disadvantage, and undermines the quid-pro-quo for the patent
grant.64
b. Claim Interpretation
Claim interpretation is a necessary part of evaluating disclosure requirements
because the scope of a patent right depends upon the scope of the technological
description.65 The best mode inquiry is dependent upon the definition of the
invention as outlined by the claims:66

61

Carlson, supra note 1, at 272 (footnote omitted). A separate best mode requirement is
essential because it requires a subjective inquiry where the other inquiries are objective. See
Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This demands that the
specification meet two separate and different inquiries thereby creating a whole other level of
scrutiny. This “other level of scrutiny” is often cited by anti-best mode proponents as a reason for
getting rid of the requirement.
62
MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03; see also Markham, supra note 52, at 148.
63
See generally Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926–928 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(stating that the appropriate inquiry is whether the inventor disclosed the best mode contemplated
by him, a determination that cannot be made solely on the basis of the prior art).
64
Carlson, supra note 1, at 272.
65
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011) (Paragraph two states that “[t]he specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention.”); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that “the definiteness requirement of the Patent Act” requires

[3:104 2012]
What Do We Do Now?
115
How the Elimination of the Best Mode Requirement Minimizes Adequate
Disclosure and Creates a Potentially Unenforceable Fact Pattern

Definition of the invention “is a legal exercise, wherein the
ordinary principles of claim construction apply.” Defining the
invention by analyzing the claim language is a crucial predicate to
the factual portions of the best mode inquiry because it ensures that
the finder of fact looks only for preferences pertaining to carrying
out the claimed invention.67
In other words, the method of claim interpretation necessarily influences the
outcome of a best mode analysis.
Two competing theories are employed in the claim interpretation process:
peripheral and central.68 Each strategy utilizes different tools and resources to
determine the scope of the claim with each strategy typically producing a different
result.
i.

Peripheral Claim Interpretation

The United States uses a peripheral claim interpretation strategy. 69 This
strategy assigns a patent right based on the technological scope of the inherent,
lingual definition of the language contained within the claim.70 Essentially, each
term is given its “ordinary meaning” as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art.71 The potential problem is that the final interpretation could cover all the
variations that are included in “the lingual definition of the generic term,
including those beyond the embodiment illustrated.”72 Thus, generic claim
language and purposely overbroad patent claims threaten to disrupt the quid pro
quo policy justification of the patent system.
The disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 have evolved to specifically
enforce the quid pro quo exchange.73 The U.S. patent system utilizes other
a specification that distinctly claims the subject matter regarded as the invention). See generally 1
MOY, supra note 3, § 4:1.
66
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
67
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)
(citing N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
68
See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4:8.
69
Id.
70
Id. This strategy depends on treating each word as a linguistic unit and assigning to each a
correct definition. Id.
71
See id.; Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for
Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 841 (2005) (“The default
rule is, according to the Federal Circuit, a word’s ‘ordinary meaning’: ‘As a starting point, we give
claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art.’”).
72
See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.8
73
Id. § 4.1 n.8 (citing In re Fischer, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
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doctrines to lessen the effects of interpreting claims peripherally, none of which
will be discussed in this article.74
ii.

Central Claim Interpretation

The other predominant claim interpretation strategy, central claiming, focuses
on the disclosed embodiments when determining the scope of the patent right.75
The analysis begins by separating out the technological disclosure from the
background information.76 The technological disclosure is then parsed for
disclosure of specific forms of inventive embodiments and the patent right
assigned covers those embodiments.77 Thus, patent rights are limited to what is
actually disclosed. This reduces the likelihood of awarding patent rights that are
not in concert with the quid pro quo exchange. This system is primarily in use
internationally.78
The fundamental differences between a central claim interpretation system
versus a peripheral claim interpretation system allow the former to adopt or
abandon certain rules and regulations that are essential to the latter system.79 That
is, the AIA “abandoned” the best mode requirement as an infringement defense,80
which present problems with post-grant enforcement. Without such a mechanism
to keep the patentee honest, there is no way of policing post-grant enforcement of
best mode: an essential element of the quid pro quo exchange. Unfortunately, this
scenario is now a reality.

74

1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.1 n.8 (citing the doctrine of equivalents and the adequate scope of
disclosure as two methods normally associated with reigning in overly broad patent rights
resulting from peripheral claiming). In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520
U.S. 17, 40–41 (1997), the Supreme Court used the doctrine of equivalents—an inquiry into how
substitute elements match the function, way and result of the claim element or whether substitute
elements play a role substantially different from claimed element—to decide that the infringing
invention did not fall within the literal scope of the patent claim but its equivalency still implied
infringement. See also Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.
1948).
75
See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4:8.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London – Local Internationalism: How
Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with Europe, the United States and
the Rest of the World, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 31, 41–42 (2004–2005) (discussing the
Epilady cases where an infringement suit was brought in several European countries including
England, a peripheral claim interpretation system, and Germany, a central claiming interpretation
system, had decidedly different outcomes that were based in part on the different claim
interpretation systems and partly on the absence of rules and regulations in the U.K.).
80
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L. No. 112–29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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III.

PRA 2011: WHAT CHANGED? HOW WILL IT INFLUENCE THE PATENT
SYSTEM GOING FORWARD?

Now that the pressure to reform the patent act has given way to the AIA,81 it is
important to consider what actually changed. Furthermore, it is important to
analyze how the desire to harmonize the U.S. patent system with the international
patent systems will affect the public policy underpinnings of the U.S patent
system. The AIA institutes a variety of changes; this paper will focus on the
AIA’s elimination of the best mode requirement as an infringement defense
mechanism.82 Before diving into an analysis of the change, it is important to
consider the current state of best mode application83 and the debate regarding the
removal of the best mode.
It is almost impossible to describe best mode’s economic impact when
comparing deterrence with increased litigation costs.84 However, contingents on
both sides have arguments in their favor.
A. Arguments For and Against the Elimination of Best Mode
The argument in favor of keeping best mode is based on enhancing disclosure
and innovation and minimizing strategic behavior by patentees. 85 Essentially,
both aspects of the argument focus on keeping the patent system in line with its
founding principles. The best mode prevents companies from obtaining a patent
right while simultaneously failing to disclose the best mode in order to retain a
trade secret.86 Prior to the AIA, inventors who failed to disclose best mode could
face a losing battle in an infringement case where the infringer used best mode as
a defense to infringement.87 In general, the current best mode doctrine
encourages disclosure—a founding principle of U.S. patent law—and discourages
strategic behavior by patentees by posing a continuous threat of invalidation.

81

Id.
Id.
83
See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.
84
Best mode’s economic and societal impact is best explained by:
[T]he existence of the requirement has a prophylactic effect. That effect insures
that most inventors will comply with the requirement; at least most of those who
are properly informed of the downside risk associated with noncompliance. A
focus on the limited number of times that patents have been invalidated by the
CAFC for a best mode violation risks underestimating the value of this
prophylactic impact.
Carlson, supra note 1, at 280.
85
See Markham, supra note 52, at 145.
86
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87
See 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (2006).
82
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The entities arguing against best mode are made up of mainly those interested
in protecting corporate interests.88 Their argument is based on three parts. First,
the best mode defense involves the state of the inventor’s mind, whose proof
depends on circumstantial evidence.89 Thus, the parties contend, litigating best
mode can be expensive and time consuming because it is based off the subjective
state of the inventors mind at the time of filing.90 Second, the “best mode is
useless” because there is no obligation to update the best mode.91 Thus, adequate
disclosure is just as likely without best mode because current doctrine provides so
little incentive to disclose.92 Third, because best mode has no counterpart in other
major patent systems, “a special hardship” is placed on foreign inventors seeking
U.S. patent protection.93 The authors of AIA essentially accepted these arguments
and removed best mode from § 282(3).
B. The Changes Adopted by PRA 2011
Patent reform has been introduced in each of the past two sessions of
congress—110th and 111th session—with no luck. Oddly, AIA 2011, as
championed by Senators Leahy and Smith, navigated its way through political
gridlock and found its way to President Obama’s desk. The language within the
bill makes substantial changes to several areas of the patent statute including but
not limited to94: first-to-file,95 post-grant review proceedings,96 preissuance
submission by third parties,97 supplemental examination,98 and best mode.99

88

See Markham, supra note 52, at 139–41.
Id. at 142.
90
See id. See generally Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct
in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, A Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for
Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 279–80 (1997).
91
See Markham, supra note 52, at 143; Transco Prods. Inc., v. Performance Contracting, Inc.,
38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994), (finding that the district court erred in holding that the applicant
must update the best mode disclosure).
92
Elimination of best mode will not enhance disclosure; it may have little to no effect. See
Markham, supra note 52, at 143. If full disclosure is the primary objective, Congress should
strengthen the best mode requirement so that it improves the quality of disclosure, not eliminate it.
See id. at 156–60.
93
See id. at 143–44; Chisum, supra note 90, at 279. But see Markham, supra note 52, at 144
(stating that at least 24 countries including Japan have some form of best mode built into their
patent systems).
94
See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284
(2011); Eric E. Bensen, Emerging Issues Analysis: Eric E. Bensen on the Patent Reform Act of
2011, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5673 (2011).
95
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat 284 (2011).
96
Id. § 6.
97
Id. § 8.
98
Id. § 12.
89
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1. Changes to 35 U.S.C. Section 282
This article focuses on the elimination of the best mode requirement.100 For a
more thorough accounting of changes to 35 U.S.C. § 282, consult the bill in its
entirety.101 As it relates to the best mode requirement, the language of § 15 of
AIA states the following:
(a) In General.—Section 282 of title 35, United States Code, is
amended in the second undesignated paragraph by striking
paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
“(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for
failure to comply with—
“(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure
to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any
claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or
otherwise unenforceable; or
(B) any requirement of section 251.”.
(b) Conforming Amendment.—Sections 119(e)(1) and 120
of title 35 United States Code, are each amended by
striking “the first paragraph of section 112 of this title” and
inserting ‘section 112(a) (other than the requirement to
disclose best mode)”.
(c)Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section
shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall apply to proceedings commenced on or after that
date.102
As stated, this provision removes best mode as an invalidity defense from §
282(3) while retaining it in § 112, paragraph 1.103
2. AIA Section 15’s Impact
Because of the new law, a predictable series of events is likely to occur. First,
the inventor has little incentive to disclose a best mode and will not do so, because

99

Id. § 15.
Id.
101
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011).
102
See id. § 15.
103
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
100
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there is no threat of invalidity for failing to do so.104 Second, without best mode
as a form of invalidity in litigation, it appears that there is little basis for
requesting discovery directed thereto.105 Therefore, there is “no practical way of
ever determining whether the best mode requirement had been satisfied with
respect to a particular patent.”106 Problematically, this leads to patents that no
longer face the threat of invalidation because they meet the written description
requirement and enablement requirement but fail to disclose the best mode.107
Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that best mode is typically used as an
invalidity mechanism rather than a statutory bar to patentability.108 Thus,
retaining its use as a statutory bar appears futile.
3. Impact of Other Provisions in the AIA
To exacerbate the problem, the AIA contains other provisions that also relax
the disclosure requirement.109 With a switch to a first-to-file system it is widely
believed a rush to secure priority will compromise the quality of disclosure.110 In
the context of such a switch, it is in the best interest of the patent system to work
to maintain adequate disclosure requirements so that society is not shortchanged
on its part of the quid pro quo exchange. Furthermore, § 5 of the AIA creates a
prior use defense that encourages companies to second guess their
commercialization strategies.111 This will likely drive the companies toward
secrecy as a means to avoid commercial use as a possible infringement defense.112

104

Eric E. Bensen, Emerging Issues Analysis: Eric E. Bensen on the America Invents Act, 2011
EMERGING ISSUES 5900 (2011).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See Carlson, supra note 1 at 272. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
108
See Markham, supra note 52, at 150–51.
109
See supra note 95 and accompanying text; FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 1 (2011)
[hereinafter FTP IP MARKETPLACE] (“Invalid or overbroad patents disrupt that balance by
discouraging follow-on innovation, preventing competition, and raising prices through
unnecessary licensing and litigation.”).
110
See Jason Rantanen, The Effects of the America Invents Act on Technological Disclosure,
PATENTLY-O (Sept. 8, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/the-effects-ofthe-america-invents-act-on-technological-disclosure.html.
111
How the creation of a prior user defense pushes toward less disclosure can be explained by
the following:
The types of inventions that the prior user defense most applies to are those
with the capability of being protected through secrecy. A prior user defense is
less important for inventions whose workings are readily understandable once
they are placed on the market because these products already represent
potentially invalidating prior art; thus, this type of defense has most relevance
for non-self disclosing inventions, a category that includes many processes.
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To better grasp the problem, picture the Patent Act as a filter that removes all
patents unworthy of patenting. A single breach in the filter will reduce the filter’s
effectiveness but will not undermine the entire filtering process if the breach can
be repaired.113 The AIA introduces a breach into the patent act filter via the
removal of best mode from § 282. Patents that hide best mode while
simultaneously securing patent rights on a separate embodiment are normally unpatentable and are collected by the filter.114 However, as a result of the breach in
the filter, those patents are now able to pass through the filter and are patentable.
Unfortunately, the filter appears unfixable under new AIA disclosure doctrine. In
search of a solution, this article explores the U.K. patent system, which just so
happened to abolish its best mode requirement in a similar context.115
IV.

U.K. DISCLOSURE IN THE ABSENCE OF BEST MODE

In order to find what insights the English system might have, it is necessary to
engage in a quick but detailed discussion on the background of the U.K. system,
the 1977 reform, and current enforcement of disclosure requirements.
A. Background of U.K. Patent System Pre-Reform
The underlying theory of the U.K. patent system is similar to the U.S.
patent system in that the state “grants the inventor an exclusive monopoly for a
limited time in his new invention in return for his disclosure of the invention so
that the public at large will be able to practise the invention once the patent
expires.”116
Under the current law, inventors who develop non-self disclosing inventions are
faced with a difficult choice: maintain the process as a trade secret, and run the
risk of being blocked later by an inventor who obtains a patent, or file for a
patent and disclose the process to the public. Both options have significant costs
associated with their selection but the patent and disclose option is hardly
foreclosed.
A prior user defense reweights this decision in favor of maintaining secrecy
because it reduces the risk of being blocked by a later inventor. The directional
effect of this change is to reduce the number of patents that are filed on secret
inventions, and thus reduce the number of mandatory disclosures that
accompany those patents.
Id.
112

See id. The entry goes on to discuss how the changes to new novelty rules that change what
counts as prior art may result in a rush to early disclosure in an effort to “stymie their
competitors.” Id.
113
Repair in this context deals with finding another mechanism to act in best mode’s place to
filter out un-patentable inventions.
114
See In Re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
115
See infra part IV.
116
BRIAN C. REID, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PATENT LAW 2 (2d ed. 1993).
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Prior to 1977, the U.K. system was predominately concerned with
addressing two fundamental issues. Is the patentee bound by good faith to
disclose the best mode?117 How does the relationship between the breadth of the
claims and the disclosure in the specification determine the scope of the patent
grant?118 The Patents Act of 1949 required the specification to contain sufficient
and fair disclosure, utility, and disclosure of the best mode.119 “The requirement
of sufficiency under U.K. patent law essentially parallels the U.S. requirements of
enablement, written description, and best mode.”120 A “sufficient” disclosure
containing all three elements in the specification would then serve as the basis for
drafting and interpreting the claims.121 Because the U.K. is a peripheral claim
interpretation regime,122 the claims serve as the “principal determinant of the
scope of the monopoly.”123 Claim breadth was kept in check by the U.K.’s “fair
basis” doctrine, which reigned in claims by invalidating those that were not
“fairly based” on the specification.124
Patent applications arising under the 1949 U.K. Patents Act were governed by
section 4(3)(b) of the Act which states: “Every complete specification . . . shall
disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to the
applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection . . . .”125 Section
4(3)(b)is analogous to the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and serves a similar
role in statutory patentability.126 The U.K. implemented the best mode in
117

See id at 52–59.
See id.
119
Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 32 (U.K.).
120
Irah H. Donner, Book Review, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 565 (1993-94)
(reviewing BRIAN C. REID, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PATENT LAW (1993)).
121
See WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLETCUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 229–30 (5th ed. 2003).
122
See id. at 167 (“What British Courts have insisted on is that the claims are there to mark out
the monopolised territory . . . . If they clearly do mean one thing, arguments that they nevertheless
mean something else will be rejected.”). The authors quote Lord Russell as saying that “no canon
or principle which will justify one in departing from the unambiguous and grammatical meaning
of a claim . . . .” Id. (quoting EMI v. Lissen (1939) 56 R.P.C. 23 at 40–41).
123
Id.
124
See Patents Act, 1949, § 32(1)(i).
125
Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 4(3)(b) (U.K.). The full text of section 4(3)
is:
(3) Every Complete Specification—
(a) shall particularly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be
performed;
b) shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to
the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection; and
c) shall end with a claim or claims defining the scope of the invention claimed.
Id.
126
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011).
118
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infringement suits via section 32(1)(h), which was analogous to 35 U.S.C. §
282(3). Section 32(1)(h) allowed best mode to be asserted as an affirmative
defense by stating that:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a patent may, on the
petition of any person interested, be revoked by the court on any of
the following grounds, that is to say, . . . that the complete
specification does not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention
and the method by which it is to be performed, or does not disclose
the best method of performing it which was known to the applicant
for the patent and for which he was entitled to claim protection . . .
.127
This section lays out not only best mode’s role as an affirmative defense and
revocation tool but also highlights the “sufficiency” and “fair basis” disclosure
requirements that U.K. courts often rely on to invalidate patents. The sufficient
disclosure—containing utility and best mode—along with the fair basis doctrine
worked together to help keep the U.K. patent system running like a well-oiled
machine. Unfortunately, the wheels came off in 1977, along with the best mode
and fair basis doctrines.
B. Patent Reform Act of 1977
In an effort to harmonize with other European nations, the British drastically
altered the regulations governing their patent system. The 1949 Patents Act
awarded patent rights when patents contained three fundamentals: a claim in the
specification that defined the subject matter scope of property in the invention, a
description in the specification that provided sufficient disclosure of that
invention, and a claim that was fairly based on the invention.128 In replacing the
1949 Act with the 1977 Act, the British removed best mode from the sufficiency
requirement and eliminated fair basis as a U.K. disclosure requirement. 129
The 1977 Patents Act replaces the language of 32(1)(h) with a new provision,
section 72(1)(c), eliminating best mode’s and fair basis doctrine’s use as
revocation tools:
127

Patents Act, 1949 § 32 (emphasis added). The case most often cited as an example of
section 32(1)(h) is American Cyanamid Co. v. Berk Pharmaceuticals, in which a patent was
revoked for failure to state the “best method” (used interchangeably with “best mode” in the U.K.)
because the applicant disclosed the option known not to produce the best results. Am. Cyanid Co.
v. Berk Pharm., [1976] R.P.C. 231.
128
David J Brennan, Biogen Sufficiency Reconsidered, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 476, 479 (2009).
129
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.). The 1977 Act was based on the EPC, so removal of the
best mode requirement was essentially a direct result of the desire to harmonize with other
European countries.
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Subject to the following provisions of this Act, the court or the
comptroller may on application of any person by order revoke a
patent for an invention on (but only on) any of the following
grounds, that is to say . . . the specification of the patent does not
disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it
to be performed by a person skilled in the art . . . .”130
This section codified a new “sufficiency” requirement which relies on a
specification that discloses the invention “clearly and completely enough for it to
be performed by a person skilled in the art.”131 This new “enabling disclosure”
fulfills the “consideration” for the patent grant.132
Also, the 1977 Patents Act chose to eliminate rather than amend section 32(i),
which contained the “fair basis” doctrine, of the 1949 Act.133 This eliminated any
role for the “fair basis” doctrine in the U.K. patent system. Fair basis is absent
from the EPC, which is why the U.K. eliminated the doctrine.
C. Post-Reform Adjudication
It turns out that the U.K. courts are dealing with a separate albeit similar
problem that the U.S. courts will soon face. The U.K. courts are having trouble
reconciling the loss of multiple disclosure requirements as a means of revocation
in the context of their peripheral claim interpretation regime. Essentially, the
1977 act required that patent rights be “supported by” the disclosure, but the

130

Id. § 72 (emphasis added). Termed the “sufficiency” clause, which had the power to serve
as grounds for revocation. See id.
131
Id. §§ 14(3), 72(1)(c); Helitune Ltd. v. Stewart Hughes Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 171, 201 (Eng.)
(noting that section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act promulgates the sufficiency doctrine from 32(1)(h) of
the 1949 Act); CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 225. The test to determine whether or
not the disclosure was sufficient was: “[W]hether a man skilled in the art can . . . rectify the
mistakes and supply the omissions with[out] the exercise of any inventive faculty? If he can, then
the description of the specification is sufficient.” Mentor Corp. v. Hollister Inc. [1993] R.P.C. 7,
14 (quoting Valensi v. British Radio Corp. [1973] R.P.C. 337) (stating that it depends on the
nature of the invention)).
132
CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 225.
133
Whether or not these disclosure requirements were truly disposed of is a question that one
commentator thinks is worth asking. Leung argues that the Patents Act of 1977 codified the
sufficiency doctrine by stating that “[t]he court . . . may . . . revoke a patent [on the ground that]
the specification of the patent does not disclose the invention clearly enough and completely
enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art.” Tim Leung, Generics (UK) Ltd v. H
Lundbeck A/S: In Search of Optimal Patent Protection: Biogen Insufficiency and the Chequered
History of Product Claims, 32(4) E.I.P.R. 165, 169 (2010) (footnote omitted).
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British had no mechanism with which to enforce it since fair basis and best mode
were removed as grounds for invalidity.134
As expected, in the absence of a best mode requirement, the definition of an
“enabling disclosure” requirement changed. In Molnlycke AB v. Proctor &
Gamble Ltd., the enabling disclosure (and its satisfaction of the sufficiency
requirement) was interpreted to mean that 72(1)(c) “does not set a standard
whereby the man skilled in the art must be able to make all possible
embodiments. But he must be able to make an embodiment using the information
disclosed in the specification . . . .”135 Thus, when a patentee need only disclose
“his ‘next but one’ best method, whilst keeping the best method itself as a trade
secret,” the patent grant (scope of the monopoly) is not at all commensurate with
the disclosure.136 As a result of the 1977 Patents Act, the U.K. had no way of
policing hidden best mode fact patterns that awarded overly broad patent rights
(although best mode can be argued under a fair basis / Biogen Sufficiency
apparatus).
Another case that highlighted the U.K. courts struggle with the new disclosure
requirement also flew in the face of U.K. patent law principles. Genentech v.
Wellcome Foundation,137 involved one of the first cases to address overly broad
patent rights without the “fair basis” doctrine. The court held that the proper
scope of claims was not a matter that could be raised after issue of the patent.138
Without use of the “fair basis” mechanism’s ability to object to claim scope postissuance of patent rights, there was no way to check to see if the overly broad
patents rights were commensurate with the scope of the monopoly. This resulted
134

David Brennan used a speech by Robin Jacob, from his 1993 Herchel Smith Lecture, where
he said:
[T]he law of insufficiency is now being called on to cover more. The trouble is
that the framers of the EPC behaved very oddly: they required the EPO and
consequently via the 1977 Act, the UK Office, to refuse grant of a patent for an
invention which was not, in the metaphorical language of the Treaty and Act,
‘supported by’ the disclosure. But such lack of support -- which we used to call
lack of fair basis -- is not a ground of invalidity. Why it should be all right if one
could get the claim past the Patent Office when it was looking other way, but not
otherwise, beats me.
Brennan, supra note 128, at 480 (quoting Robin Jacob, The Herchel Smith Lecture 1993,
[1993] E.I.P.R. 312, 314–315). This summarizes the idea of a free beer claim—no
mechanism with which to regulate over broad claiming.
135
[1992] F.S.R. 549, [1994] R.P.C. 94 (emphasis added). See also Genentech Inc’s (Human
Growth Hormone) Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 613; Quantel v. Spaceward Microsystems Ltd., [1990]
R.P.C. 147.
136
See REID, supra note 116, at 55.
137
[1989] R.P.C. 147.
138
CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 230.
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in a windfall for the patentee and violated a core principle of the patent system.
Again, the U.K. patent system watched helplessly.
D. Resurrection of 1949 Sufficiency
At least one Judge in the House of Lords did not like how the recent line of
cases did not align with U.K. patent law principles. In Biogen Inc v. Medeva Plc,
the courts laid out how to deal with cases where the lack of support from the
specification leads to overly broad patent rights.139 The court sought to address
the issue of overly broad claims not being supported by the specification, but
ended up arguing for a “sufficiency” disclosure requirement to combat overly
broad claiming.
Lord Hoffman stated that in his view section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Patents Act
intended to ensure that grounds for invalidity included cases where “the extent of
the monopoly claimed exceeds the technical contribution to the art made by the
invention as described in the specification.”140 Lord Hoffman noted that under
the 1949 Act, “fair basis” doctrine provided a means to invalidate these types of
claims. He argued that the “fair basis” doctrine never went away and was readily
applicable in Biogen and therefore invalidated the claims that were not supported
by the specification.141 Lord Hoffman argued that the fair basis doctrine existed
within EPC 83 and 84—which had equivalents in the Patents Act of 1977 in 14(3)
and (5).142 Section 72 of the Act included the language of 14(3), but not 14(5).143
139

38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1. Biogen does not address best mode, but rather it
signifies the struggle that U.K. courts had with the Patents Act of 1977. Biogen sought a patent on
an artificially created molecule of DNA that when introduced into a host cell will make antigens of
the virus hepatitis B. Id. ¶ 9. Because Biogen was one of the first biotechnology patent cases
adjudicated in the U.K. courts, a line of reasoning existed that the scope should be limited in order
to avoid stifling innovation in an infant industry. Id. ¶ 75.
140
Id. ¶ 80.
141
Id.
142
Lord Hoffman stated:
But the disappearance of "lack of fair basis" as an express ground for
revocation does not in my view mean that general principle which it expressed
has been abandoned. The jurisprudence of the EPO shows that it is still in full
vigour and embodied in articles 83 and 84 of the EPC, of which the equivalents
in the 1977 Act are section 14(3) and (5) and section 72(l)(c).
Id. ¶ 80. The 1977 Act rearranged the statute’s specification requirements—previously under their
own separate heading in the 1949 Act—which are now grouped in with the section “Making of
Application.” Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14 (U.K.). Section 14(3) states “[t]he specification of
an application shall disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough
for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art.” Id. Section 14(5) states “[t]he
claim or claims shall—(a) define the matter for which the applicant seeks protection; (b) be clear
and concise; (c) be supported by the description; and (d) relate to one invention or to a group of
inventions which are so linked as to form a single inventive concept.” Id.
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Thus, Biogen held that the sufficiency doctrine of section 72(1)(c) (clearly enough
and completely enough) included a “fair basis” claim analysis, and that
specification sufficiency should be evaluated using both doctrines (called Biogen
Sufficiency).
This case ended up being quite controversial, because the “fair basis” doctrine
was itself controversial,144 and critics believed that this brought U.K. law on
sufficiency (disclosure) and scope of claim out of step with the European Patent
Office (“EPO”).145 This view is short sighted; all Lord Hoffman advocated for
was the application of pseudo-central claim interpretation, but unfortunately chose
to frame the argument in terms of fair basis doctrine. An analysis based on
central claim interpretation would have put the United Kingdom in line with the
central claim interpretation regime of the EPO. Further, Lord Hoffman was
progressive in the sense that he created a mechanism for adjudicating hidden best
mode fact patterns. When a hidden best mode fact pattern arises and there is no
mechanism with which to strike it down, the sufficiency doctrine, which includes
the fair basis doctrine, gives the United Kingdom the best chance of doing so.146
In H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd,147 the court reacted to the Biogen
Sufficiency doctrine and sought to bring U.K. patent law back in line with the
European patent office. The court argued that Lord Hoffman’s reasoning that a
patentee’s monopoly should always be restricted to the patentee’s contribution to
the art was not based on any principle in U.K. patent law.148 Essentially, the court
argues that sufficiency should not be used to “correct” a patent that claims a

143

See H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd, [2009] UKHL 12, 15.
Tim Leung notes:
These issues were compounded by the apparent conflation of the two quite
different reasons why the fair basing test was introduced in the 1949 Act: the
problem of undue claim width in a complete specification, and the issue of
disconformity between a provisional and complete specification in the context of
priority dates. As such, it has been argued that the introduction of fair basing,
was the vehicle by which the clarity of earlier law was lost.
Leung, supra note 133, at 169.
145
Rowan Freeland & Galya Blachman, The Law of Sufficiency: Is Biogen Still Good Law?,
31(9) E.I.P.R. 478, 478–483 (2009). The EPO did not allow invalidation based on the fair basis
doctrine.
146
Fair basis awards patent rights only to those claims that are supported in the specification;
thus, no best mode, no patent right, and no protection in an infringement case. See Biogen Inc v.
Medeva Plc, 38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1, ¶ 80.
147
[2009] UKHL 12. The court addressed the validity of a patent awarded to Lundbeck
relating to escitalopram (an anti-depressant).
148
Remco E.P. De Ranitz & Otto P. Swens, UK Patent Law Crosses the Channel, 30 E.I.P.R.
389, 391 (2008) (noting that the Patents Act of 1977 got rid of the “fair basis” doctrine).
144
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product and a way of making the product.149 Rather, the court argues that an
invention is “sufficiently enabled if the specification and common general
knowledge enable the skilled person to make it.”150
Lundbeck does bring the U.K. patent system more in line with the EPO in
regard to sufficiency because the EPO does not recognize the fair basis
doctrine.151 However, it is important to note that in post reform adjudication, best
mode invalidation is likely to find a home in sufficiency doctrine whatever its
current form.152 This is the case because pre-reform best mode was adjudicated as
an element of the sufficiency doctrine.
V.

ANALYSIS: HANDLING OF FUTURE “HIDDEN BEST MODE” CASES

There are fundamental differences between the U.K. and the U.S. situations.
First, in the U.K., the 1977 Act eliminated the best mode disclosure requirement
but left the patent system with a sufficiency doctrine that could serve much the
same purpose.153
Furthermore, although a subsequent U.K. court has
distinguished Biogen, the Biogen Sufficiency doctrine provides an umbrella for
which to argue best mode violations.154 The AIA does not put in place an
invalidity mechanism that is similar to the one it takes away. It could be some
time before a court hears a case involving a hidden best mode fact pattern under
the new law. What options do courts have when a hidden best mode fact pattern
finally makes it in front of the court?155

149

Id.
See Freeland & Blachman, supra note 145, at 482.
151
Id. The EPO does not have to recognize the fair basis doctrine because of its central claim
interpretation regime works in place of the doctrine.
152
CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 229. Pre-reform best mode was adjudicated as
an element of the sufficiency doctrine. Thus, when a hidden best mode fact pattern arises and
there is no mechanism with which to strike it down, the sufficiency doctrine that includes the fair
basis doctrine gives the United Kingdom the best chance of doing so.
153
The Patents Act of 1977 did not remove all of the tools under which a best mode case may
be adjudicated as evidenced by the Biogen decision. See infra Part V.C.
154
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155
One solution in particular would have allowed an infringer to challenge the priority of the
initial application by claiming that a missing best mode meant that the disclosure was not
complete and therefore there was no priority date. Unfortunately for future infringers, the drafters
of AIA thought of that first and included in the amended statute: “CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—
Sections 119(e)(1) and 120 of title 35, United States Code, are each amended by striking ‘the first
paragraph of section 112 of this title’ and inserting ‘section112(a) (other than the requirement to
disclose the best mode)’.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284,
328 (2011).
150
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A. English Influence
An analysis of the U.K. best mode enforcement landscape revealed two
disparate alternatives: strict adherence to the new disclosure requirements,156 or a
loose statutory construction of the disclosure requirements in favor of
invalidation.157 It is apparent that following the former alternative, essentially
following AIA as is, is not a viable option because it violates the principles upon
which the U.S. patent system was founded. The latter alternative, as explained
earlier, is a viable option because Lord Hoffman was really advocating for a
central claim interpretation regime under the guise of a “fair basis” rationale.
B. Move Towards a Central Claim Interpretation Regime
Elimination of the best mode requirement as an affirmative defense creates a
situation where there may be no means to invalidate a patent that generally
enables but does not disclose the best mode. This problem is created, in part, by
the fact that the U.S. patent system is a peripheral claim interpretation system.158
By switching to a central claim interpretation system, the U.S. patent system
would establish a mechanism with which to go after hidden best mode claims.
Patent rights would be granted only to what is disclosed in the specification.159
Thus, no disclosure of best mode means protection against infringers who practice
it.
Lord Hoffman viewed central claiming as a means to make up for a weakened
disclosure requirement post-1977 reform.160 The adoption of the 1977 Act
introduced language in section 14(5) that required the claim to be supported by
the description, which drawn from the EPC was meant to resemble a central claim
interpretation.161 Lord Hoffman articulated this stance in Biogen stating “that the
specification must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the
monopoly claimed.”162 If the invention discloses a principle capable of general
application, the claims may be in correspondingly general terms.”163
156

H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd, [2009] UKHL 12 (producing a result inconsistent
with principles of patent system).
157
Biogen, Inc v. Medeva, Plc, 38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1.
158
See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.1.
159
See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 80; Lundbeck, [2009] UKHL 12, ¶ 47. Lord Hoffman
incorporated reasoning into his Biogen opinion that is indicative of a central claim interpretation
regime. Id. ¶ 80. In not particularly good form, Lord Hoffman addressed the revival of the fair
basis doctrine. Id. This ignited a flurry of criticism and is one of the reasons that Biogen is so
famous. See Freeland & Blachman, supra note 145, at 478–83.
160
See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 80.
161
See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14(5) (U.K.).
162
See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 63.
163
Id.
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The CAFC instituted a similar push towards central claim interpretation in the
late 1990’s.164 The decisions set out to encourage explicit disclosure in the
specification of all embodiments so that claims would be supported and not risk
invalidation.165 When deciding future hidden best mode fact patterns, future
courts can rely on this string of cases to provide a foundation upon which to
establish a central claim interpretation regime. This will provide both a
mechanism to police patents that slip through the patent act filter, as well as
acting as a deterrent to future patentees to disclose the best mode or face a narrow
reading of their claim.
C. Strengthen Enforcement of Section 112 Paragraph 1: Require Updating
The best mode requirement neither requires that the best mode be designated
nor updated.166 As the USPTO solicits comments on the new law, there is sure to
be clamoring for an amendment that requires a patentee to declare the best mode
and to update the best mode during prosecution.167 A downside to this approach
is that any update to the best mode that is “adding a specific mode of practicing
the invention not described in the application as filed” is considered a new matter
and is barred by § 132 of the Patent Act.168 However, strengthening the role of §
112 in patentability will encourage innovation by increasing the likelihood of
follow-on inventions.169 The best use of a stronger § 112 would be in conjunction
with the inequitable conduct doctrine.
D. Inequitable Conduct Invalidity in Place of Best Mode
The inequitable conduct doctrine alone is not enough to enforce patents that
fail to disclose best mode.170 Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco

164

David C. Radulescu, The Federal Circuit’s Narrowing of the Literal Scope of Patent Claims
by Focussing on Embodiments Disclosed in the Specification, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 539 (2000). Radulescu uses the discussion of four “broad claim construction” opinions to
highlight what appeared to be a push by the Federal Circuit requiring patentees to broadly describe
the invention in the body of the patent as well as in the claims.
165
See id.
166
See supra notes 53, 54, and accompanying text.
167
See Markham, supra note 52, at 156. Anti-best mode proponents argue that requiring both
declaration and updating would go a long way to strengthening the best mode requirement.
168
See MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.01(V).
169
See FTC IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 109, at 1 (stating that adequate public notice via
disclosure requirements provide future inventors with all tools necessary to “follow on.”).
170
See Field Hybrids v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 03-4121 ADM/JSM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1159, at *36 (D. Minn. Jan. 37, 2005) (finding plaintiff's patents invalid for a best mode violation
even though defendant offered no evidence of specific intent to deceive).
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International Inc.171 lays out the relationship between best mode and inequitable
conduct:
Because disclosure of the best mode is statutorily required, see 35
U.S.C. § 112, failure to disclose that best mode is inherently
material and, we believe, reaches the minimum level of materiality
necessary for a finding of inequitable conduct. On the other hand,
since the failure to disclose the best mode is not excused even if
unintentional, but inequitable conduct requires a ‘threshold’ level
of intent, the failure to disclose the best mode will not constitute
inequitable conduct in every case.172
However, the Federal Circuit recently tightened the standard for finding
inequitable conduct in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co..173 An
applicant must now meet the clear and convincing evidence standard by
specifically intending to deceive the USPTO.174 Under the AIA, where there is no
intent to deceive and no best mode requirement, the patent is likely to slip through
the patent act filter. This is where a stronger § 112 comes into play. Failure to
declare or update the best mode175 would satisfy, upon proof by clear and
convincing evidence, that the applicant intended to deceive the USPTO thereby
establishing grounds for a finding of inequitable conduct making the patent
unenforceable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Elimination of the best mode requirement sends a message that adequate
disclosure really is only an ancillary purpose of the patent system; incentive to
invent and commercialization are the sole purposes and adequate disclosure is
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910 F.2d 804, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In order to show inequitable conduct the moving party
must meet a clear and convincing evidence of a threshold degree of materiality of the nondisclosed
information. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The high
standard reduces the doctrine’s usefulness as an alternative to best mode.
172
Consolidated, 910 F.2d at 808 (citations omitted). See also Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.,
52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The court held that Novopharm did not have a case of
inequitable conduct because it failed to carry its burden of proving an intent to deceive by clear
and convincing evidence.
173
649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (2011) (en banc) (“This court now tightens the standards for finding
both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of
the public.”).
174
See id. See Zhe Peng et al., A Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown
Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look Into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16
VA. J.L. & TECH. 373 (2011), for a discussion on inequitable conduct before and after Therasense.
175
See supra note 167 and accompanying test.
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only an impediment towards achieving these goals.176 Simple steps are all that is
needed to bring disclosure back to the forefront of the quid pro quo exchange.
Short of re-instituting best mode as an affirmative defense, the most appropriate
solutions are to either shift towards a central claim interpretation regime or couple
a strengthened § 112-best mode with the inequitable conduct doctrine.

176

See Devlin, supra note 16, at 406 (arguing that society is better off with a patent system
where incentive to invent and commercialization are the primary rationales and where adequate
disclosure can be a hindrance in pursuit of invention and commercialization).

